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The intentionality of subjective functioning: A multiscale approach to consciousness
Work on split-brain patients and blindsight indicates that perceptual cues are not responsible for subjective awareness. A new approach is needed to bridge the gap between the conscious and unconscious experience of acting. We can build complex actions unconsciously and consciously, but when we do something unintentionally, it is done unconsciously, yet it remains part of our conscious reality. Therefore, consciousness slips into subjective intentionality because it is primarily an unconscious phenomenon in precognitive affect, and only secondarily, it forms into intentions and is sensed as feelings in cognition. In this special issue, we call on papers that can close the gap between the unconscious intentions in action carrying meaning and the intentional agency that triggers subjective intentionality. The issue aims to further advance the biology of subjectivity as a tool for understanding the nature of brain-based consciousness. We welcome papers from experimental psychology and medical fields, philosophers of the mind, and theoretical biologists.
Organizing editor: Dr Eda Alemdar
The mind and the brain: A multiscale interpretation of cognitive functionality: A multi
In this special issue, we invite quantum chemists, cognitive psychologist, and neuropsychiatrists on the topic of the mind and brain from a multiscale perspective. The multiscale perspective emphasizes information and the decoupling between biological informational structures at multiple scales that constitute extraordinary complexity, the outlines of which are only beginning to be understood. Applications stemming from the disintegration of conscious experience through disintegrated information within the unity of consciousness happen in Charles Bonnet syndrome, disjunctive agnosia, and schizophrenia. This entails acknowledging that consciousness and memory are multiscale, requiring a psychogenic understanding of brain functionality. Other phenomena include 'blindsight,' which clinically addresses the need for irreducible units of feelings, and ”subjective experiences,” when differences in conscious experience occur in near-death or phantom limb.
Guest editor: Prof. Michael Spivey, Author of "The Continuity of Mind".
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