Open Access
Original Research
A Formalizable Proof of the No-Supervenience Theorem: A Diagonal Limitation on the Viability of Physicalist Theories of Consciousness.
Catherine M. Reason
Author Affiliations
London, United Kingdom
Abstract
The no-supervenience theorem limits the capacity of physicalist theories to provide a comprehensive account of human consciousness. The proof of the theorem is difficult to formalize because it relies on both alethic and epistemic notions of possibility. This article outlines a formalizable proof using predicate modal logic in which the epistemic inferences are expressed in terms of an existing mathematical formalism, the inference device (Wolpert, 2008). The resulting proof shows definitely that any physicalist theory which describes a self-aware, intelligent system must be internally inconsistent.
Keywords
Wolpert Inference Device; Mathematical study of consciousness; No-go theorem; Disproof of supervenience.
How to cite this article
Catherine M. Reason (2026). A Formalizable Proof of the No-Supervenience Theorem: A Diagonal Limitation on the Viability of Physicalist Theories of Consciousness. Journal of Multiscale Neuroscience (5)4, 158-165.
Conflict of Interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Copyright
© 2026 The Author(s). Published by Neural Press. This is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
Disclaimer
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