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The act of understanding uncertainty is consciousness
Roman R. Poznanski,  Jan Holmgren,  Lleuvelyn A. Cacha,   Eda Alemdar and  Erkki J. Brändas (2023) The act of understanding certainty is consciousness. Journal of Multiscale Neuroscience 2(2), 280-291.


We define precognitive affect, composed of information holding dispositional states, as noncontextual, rudimentary building blocks of subjective intentionality. We take on a psychodynamic approach to intentional agency. Intentions unfold into actions in animate thermodynamics reducing subjective uncertainty by negentropic action. They are intentions in action carrying meaning in species having complex protein interactions with various regulated gene sets. In particular, the unfolding of intentionality in terms of biological purpose introduced by subjective functioning allows for a satisfactory account of subjective intentionality. The underlying experience of acting paves the way for understanding meaning of precognitive affect from subjective functioning. Therefore, the brain’s subjective intentionality as the underlying experience of acting is embedded in a negentropic “consciousness code” of “hidden” thermodynamic energy. It is the negentropically-derived quantum potential energy in the unified functioning of brain consciousness at the macroscopic scale. While at the mesoscopic scale, Schrödinger processes create boundary conditions for negentropic action to inform the intentional agency.

Keywords:   Consciousness, dispositional states, intentionality, negentropic action, subjective uncertainty, understanding, functional entropy, affect.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest

Copyright: © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Neural Press.

This is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the CC BY 4.0 license.

Disclaimer: The statements, opinions, and data in the Journal of Multiscale Neuroscience are solely those of the individual authors and contributors, not those of the Neural Press™ or the editors(s).


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